What is Anti-Americanism?
Part I: Soft Anti-Americanism
by Evan Campbell
Since the Vietnam War, the world has seen a gradual but drastic increase in anti-American activity and sentiment. Despite the complexity of the phenomenon and its far-reaching social, political, and economic consequences, it has for the most part received little attention in Western academe, for reasons which will be discussed below. There are many who would seek to lump together the disparate influences and motivations of anti-Americanism under one monolithic banner. However, for analytical and practical purposes, it is useful to separate anti-American sentiment into (at least) two categories. These are “soft” and “hard” anti-Americanism. A possible third category might best be called official or even communist anti-Americanism, though with the fall of the Soviet Union, this phenomenon has become far less important and is a topic for a later date. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the soft and hard varieties have been the greatest challenges of and obstacles to American policymaking. Furthermore, contrary to the anti-Americanism of the former Soviet Union, softs and hards dislike the United States for reasons not always connected to concrete policy objectives–e.g. the Soviet Union’s gambit to usurp Washington’s primacy in international affairs. On the contrary, anti-American publics are often manipulated by political elites for reasons other than the potential benefits of openly opposing Washington in the international system, i.e. instead for purely domestic political gain. Although anti-Americanism very often has concrete political consequences, its strength as a political tool relies on its almost gut acceptance by a broad spectrum of the world public. This project, then, is concerned as much with the ideology of anti-Americanism as with its practical results. In this first installment, we shall examine the roots of soft anti-Americanism.
Soft anti-Americanism might almost be called European anti-Americanism, though it is prevalent in many other parts of the world, including Canada, Japan, Africa, Latin America, and, some would argue, the United States itself. It has its real roots in the nineteenth century, not just in European assumptions of American intellectual inferiority (revealed, for instance, in the contempt with which European general staffs around 1914 regarded the tactical developments of the American Civil War) but also in Occidentalism, the belief, once prevalent among Asian peoples, that Westerners were fat, lazy, lax in their convictions, or what have you (though in the nineteenth century this also applied to Europe). More recently, however, soft anti-Americanism can be traced to the Vietnam era. The generation of student rebels that came of age during that conflict sought to tear down the more or less positive post-war consensus on the democratic West, challenging the United States and its allies for their unbalanced economic policies, their imperialism, and their having pushed the world to the brink of nuclear war. They posited an anti-totalitarian and egalitarian view of the world, one in which the political and economic elites of superpowers could not hold the fates of the peons below them in some sort of precarious balance.
When the United States withdrew from Vietnam, many of these radicals jettisoned their blue jeans for business suits–the “hippie to yuppie” phenomenon so well-known it is almost now cliché. But many of them took positions of influence in the resultant, uneasy consensus of the 1970s and 1980s. Much of the West’s professorate is still dominated by them. But, more importantly, former leftist radicals have now taken the reigns of power, mostly in Europe. In this instance it is easiest and sufficient to take France and Germany as the prime exemplars of soft anti-Americanism.
In Germany, for instance, the consensus of the 1960s generation was, in the words of historian Jeffrey Olick, one of the “moral nation.”<1> Since that generation rejected not only the crimes of the United States but also the heinous crimes of their parents’ generation, it could claim moral superiority over the grievous injustices then being committed around the world, not just Vietnam but also the Prague Spring of 1968. More importantly, however, “ by criticizing the ‘superficial culture’ of the United States, one could easily highlight European and German cultural profundity without stumbling into the taboo subject of German nationalism.”<2> Soft anti-Americanism is not always entirely about opposition to Washington’s policies. Indeed, many Europeans express admiration for American political institutions and affection for Americans as people, and openly proclaim that they only dislike US foreign policy or even just President Bush. Dislike of Washington has a deeper meaning: it enables Europeans (and others) to define themselves positively without resorting to the sort of crass nationalism or vain triumphalism of which they accuse the US. Soft anti-Americanism, therefore, is more a point of reference than a call to action.
Simon Serfaty has noted that what makes the recent surge of European anti-Americanism special is that it “emerged from the bottom up, as public opposition to the use of force in Iraq grew even among countries whose government was openly and adamantly supportive of the United States.”<3> This is indeed true: anti-Americanism is an ideology that comes from the ground up, but today it is also one that figures in the policy decisions of European political elites.
Take, for example, the massive popularity of Michael Moore in Europe. In a way, he represents a bridge between bottom-up anti-Americanism and its manipulation from the top down. His books sell more copies in German than in English. In France, Michael Moore’s film Bowling for Columbine (2002) was showered with accolades, not just the coveted Palm d’Or at Cannes (as though that honor were not enough), but even the Cannes Prix Educational Nationale–the Cannes National Education Prize–which was given to him just hours before the conclusion of the 55th Cannes Film Festival. Each year, one film at Cannes is selected for its educational value. In 2002, this was Moore’s film. Two years later Fahrenheit 9/11 received the same honor. But even before, Moore’s polemic against the excesses of industrial capitalism, Roger & Me, had been made part of the French national curriculum, and screenings of the film occur annually in French schools.<4> Why? Moore’s films have been roundly criticized for confusing events, manipulating chronology, and even falsifying documents. Moreover, these criticisms do not come exclusively from the political right. The value of pure filmmaking aside, are polemics really a viable part of pedagogy? Why would a national education ministry select polemics critical of another nation-state’s policies as required viewing for its citizens? Even the numerous anti-Soviet films produced in Hollywood during the Cold War did not receive this honor from the American Department of Education. The films’ popularity aside, why is it necessary to inject polemical criticism of Washington into official dialogue, let alone education?
The answer is that soft anti-Americanism can sometimes be a call to action. French policy for decades has been one of opposition to Washington’s foreign policy initiatives, and European political leaders frequently play the “Uncle Sam card” to maintain their domestic positions. The key to the success of this tactic is an anti-American public. Most famous is German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s ride to electoral victory in 2002 by outright refusing, unlike his opponent Edmund Stoiber, to cooperate with Washington’s policy towards Iraq. Two and a half years later, Jacques Chirac tried unsuccessfully to drum up support for the EU Constitution by claiming that to reject it would be to support the interests of the US, and, furthermore, that the Constitution was designed to stave off the influence of “Anglo-Saxon economics.” In the end, the French rejection of the Constitution probably stemmed from its economics being too Anglo-Saxon for Gallic tastes, but Chirac’s “Oui” campaign still demonstrates how anti-Americanism can influence internal European politics.
What we have with soft anti-Americanism, then, is a general feeling prevalent among individual citizens that the influence of Washington in the international system is generally a bad one. This criticism, much of it legitimate, stems from foreign policies seen to be destabilizing, American support for Israel against Palestine, the mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay, the primacy of American multinationals in global commerce and finance, and any number of other grievances. Whatever the reasons for it, on an individual level soft anti-Americanism is usually based on moral criticisms. As has also been noted, the power of anti-Americanism to positively define the self plays a role. But at a higher level, political elites have had great success in manipulating the sentiments of their constituencies. As long as the public opposes Washington, all the regime must do is also give the appearance of also opposing Washington to retain power. This hearkens back to theories of foreign policy as a means of social control, perhaps most lucidly enumerated in the thesis of “social imperialism” in Bismarck’s Germany, whereby historians have charged that the Iron Chancellor pulled at the heartstrings of German nationalism abroad in order to retain control of an increasingly volatile domestic environment.<5>
Soft anti-Americanism can thus be described as an ideology with its roots in the turbulence of the 1960s student movements which, while proceeding from the bottom up, as Serfaty noted, has also entered the higher levels of political elites by means of former radicals entering politics. (Most obvious here are Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in Germany) It plays an important role in national self-definition, and given its widespread nature can serve as a common bond for groups who otherwise have little in common. Opposition to Washington, after all, has helped cement that unlikeliest of partnerships--that between France and Germany. And finally, while at their base many of the grievances upon which anti-Americanism is based are valid, or at least important subjects for debate, the ideology of soft anti-Americanism is repeatedly employed as a political tool--a sort of wedge issue that forces voters to choose between their own government and being on the side of Washington, whose policies so many abhor.
In the end, especially since other governments do not pursue policies that are legitimately alternatives to Washington (at least in terms of the moralistic typesets in which these issues are framed), soft anti-Americanism is an ideology like any other: disobedient of its own logic, not always rational, and often arbitrary. Just as Americans espoused anti-communism for reasons not always connected to, for instance, the human rights abuses of the Soviet Union, so does anti-Americans' opposition to Washington not always conform to their own stated principles.
<1> Olick, Jeffrey. “What Does it Mean to Normalize the Past? Official Memory in German Politics Since 1989" in Social Science History, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter 1998), 547-571.
<2> Werz, Michael. “Anti-Americanism and Ambivalence in the New Germany” in US-Europe Analysis Series, Brookings Institution, (January 2005), 3.
<3> Serfaty, Simon. “Anti-Europeanism in America and anti-Americanism in Europe,” in Balis & Serfaty, eds. Visions of America and Europe: September 11, Iraq, and Transatlantic Relations, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004, 11.
<4> From URL: http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/message/index.php?messageDate=2002-05-27
“The day began yesterday with ‘Bowling for Columbine’ winning ‘Best Film’ from a vote of hundreds of French teachers and students from arond the country who each year come to Cannes and award one movie their ‘Cannes Prix Educational National.’ It's the only ‘people's prize’ at Cannes where everyday citizens get to screen the films and vote. It was a wonderful moment and a great honor to receive this award. The Education Ministry in France has made ‘Roger & Me’ part of the French national curriculum and it is shown each year in every school in France. The same will now happen with ‘Bowling for Columbine.’”
<5> The most famous study of “social imperialism” in Germany is Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s German Empire, 1871-1918, Oxford: Berg, 1985, trans. by Kim Traynor. Many level the same criticism at US foreign policy, but given the evidence in the European case, it is possible to say that the phenomenon plays a role everywhere.
Part I: Soft Anti-Americanism
by Evan Campbell
Since the Vietnam War, the world has seen a gradual but drastic increase in anti-American activity and sentiment. Despite the complexity of the phenomenon and its far-reaching social, political, and economic consequences, it has for the most part received little attention in Western academe, for reasons which will be discussed below. There are many who would seek to lump together the disparate influences and motivations of anti-Americanism under one monolithic banner. However, for analytical and practical purposes, it is useful to separate anti-American sentiment into (at least) two categories. These are “soft” and “hard” anti-Americanism. A possible third category might best be called official or even communist anti-Americanism, though with the fall of the Soviet Union, this phenomenon has become far less important and is a topic for a later date. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the soft and hard varieties have been the greatest challenges of and obstacles to American policymaking. Furthermore, contrary to the anti-Americanism of the former Soviet Union, softs and hards dislike the United States for reasons not always connected to concrete policy objectives–e.g. the Soviet Union’s gambit to usurp Washington’s primacy in international affairs. On the contrary, anti-American publics are often manipulated by political elites for reasons other than the potential benefits of openly opposing Washington in the international system, i.e. instead for purely domestic political gain. Although anti-Americanism very often has concrete political consequences, its strength as a political tool relies on its almost gut acceptance by a broad spectrum of the world public. This project, then, is concerned as much with the ideology of anti-Americanism as with its practical results. In this first installment, we shall examine the roots of soft anti-Americanism.
Soft anti-Americanism might almost be called European anti-Americanism, though it is prevalent in many other parts of the world, including Canada, Japan, Africa, Latin America, and, some would argue, the United States itself. It has its real roots in the nineteenth century, not just in European assumptions of American intellectual inferiority (revealed, for instance, in the contempt with which European general staffs around 1914 regarded the tactical developments of the American Civil War) but also in Occidentalism, the belief, once prevalent among Asian peoples, that Westerners were fat, lazy, lax in their convictions, or what have you (though in the nineteenth century this also applied to Europe). More recently, however, soft anti-Americanism can be traced to the Vietnam era. The generation of student rebels that came of age during that conflict sought to tear down the more or less positive post-war consensus on the democratic West, challenging the United States and its allies for their unbalanced economic policies, their imperialism, and their having pushed the world to the brink of nuclear war. They posited an anti-totalitarian and egalitarian view of the world, one in which the political and economic elites of superpowers could not hold the fates of the peons below them in some sort of precarious balance.
When the United States withdrew from Vietnam, many of these radicals jettisoned their blue jeans for business suits–the “hippie to yuppie” phenomenon so well-known it is almost now cliché. But many of them took positions of influence in the resultant, uneasy consensus of the 1970s and 1980s. Much of the West’s professorate is still dominated by them. But, more importantly, former leftist radicals have now taken the reigns of power, mostly in Europe. In this instance it is easiest and sufficient to take France and Germany as the prime exemplars of soft anti-Americanism.
In Germany, for instance, the consensus of the 1960s generation was, in the words of historian Jeffrey Olick, one of the “moral nation.”<1> Since that generation rejected not only the crimes of the United States but also the heinous crimes of their parents’ generation, it could claim moral superiority over the grievous injustices then being committed around the world, not just Vietnam but also the Prague Spring of 1968. More importantly, however, “ by criticizing the ‘superficial culture’ of the United States, one could easily highlight European and German cultural profundity without stumbling into the taboo subject of German nationalism.”<2> Soft anti-Americanism is not always entirely about opposition to Washington’s policies. Indeed, many Europeans express admiration for American political institutions and affection for Americans as people, and openly proclaim that they only dislike US foreign policy or even just President Bush. Dislike of Washington has a deeper meaning: it enables Europeans (and others) to define themselves positively without resorting to the sort of crass nationalism or vain triumphalism of which they accuse the US. Soft anti-Americanism, therefore, is more a point of reference than a call to action.
Simon Serfaty has noted that what makes the recent surge of European anti-Americanism special is that it “emerged from the bottom up, as public opposition to the use of force in Iraq grew even among countries whose government was openly and adamantly supportive of the United States.”<3> This is indeed true: anti-Americanism is an ideology that comes from the ground up, but today it is also one that figures in the policy decisions of European political elites.
Take, for example, the massive popularity of Michael Moore in Europe. In a way, he represents a bridge between bottom-up anti-Americanism and its manipulation from the top down. His books sell more copies in German than in English. In France, Michael Moore’s film Bowling for Columbine (2002) was showered with accolades, not just the coveted Palm d’Or at Cannes (as though that honor were not enough), but even the Cannes Prix Educational Nationale–the Cannes National Education Prize–which was given to him just hours before the conclusion of the 55th Cannes Film Festival. Each year, one film at Cannes is selected for its educational value. In 2002, this was Moore’s film. Two years later Fahrenheit 9/11 received the same honor. But even before, Moore’s polemic against the excesses of industrial capitalism, Roger & Me, had been made part of the French national curriculum, and screenings of the film occur annually in French schools.<4> Why? Moore’s films have been roundly criticized for confusing events, manipulating chronology, and even falsifying documents. Moreover, these criticisms do not come exclusively from the political right. The value of pure filmmaking aside, are polemics really a viable part of pedagogy? Why would a national education ministry select polemics critical of another nation-state’s policies as required viewing for its citizens? Even the numerous anti-Soviet films produced in Hollywood during the Cold War did not receive this honor from the American Department of Education. The films’ popularity aside, why is it necessary to inject polemical criticism of Washington into official dialogue, let alone education?
The answer is that soft anti-Americanism can sometimes be a call to action. French policy for decades has been one of opposition to Washington’s foreign policy initiatives, and European political leaders frequently play the “Uncle Sam card” to maintain their domestic positions. The key to the success of this tactic is an anti-American public. Most famous is German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s ride to electoral victory in 2002 by outright refusing, unlike his opponent Edmund Stoiber, to cooperate with Washington’s policy towards Iraq. Two and a half years later, Jacques Chirac tried unsuccessfully to drum up support for the EU Constitution by claiming that to reject it would be to support the interests of the US, and, furthermore, that the Constitution was designed to stave off the influence of “Anglo-Saxon economics.” In the end, the French rejection of the Constitution probably stemmed from its economics being too Anglo-Saxon for Gallic tastes, but Chirac’s “Oui” campaign still demonstrates how anti-Americanism can influence internal European politics.
What we have with soft anti-Americanism, then, is a general feeling prevalent among individual citizens that the influence of Washington in the international system is generally a bad one. This criticism, much of it legitimate, stems from foreign policies seen to be destabilizing, American support for Israel against Palestine, the mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay, the primacy of American multinationals in global commerce and finance, and any number of other grievances. Whatever the reasons for it, on an individual level soft anti-Americanism is usually based on moral criticisms. As has also been noted, the power of anti-Americanism to positively define the self plays a role. But at a higher level, political elites have had great success in manipulating the sentiments of their constituencies. As long as the public opposes Washington, all the regime must do is also give the appearance of also opposing Washington to retain power. This hearkens back to theories of foreign policy as a means of social control, perhaps most lucidly enumerated in the thesis of “social imperialism” in Bismarck’s Germany, whereby historians have charged that the Iron Chancellor pulled at the heartstrings of German nationalism abroad in order to retain control of an increasingly volatile domestic environment.<5>
Soft anti-Americanism can thus be described as an ideology with its roots in the turbulence of the 1960s student movements which, while proceeding from the bottom up, as Serfaty noted, has also entered the higher levels of political elites by means of former radicals entering politics. (Most obvious here are Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in Germany) It plays an important role in national self-definition, and given its widespread nature can serve as a common bond for groups who otherwise have little in common. Opposition to Washington, after all, has helped cement that unlikeliest of partnerships--that between France and Germany. And finally, while at their base many of the grievances upon which anti-Americanism is based are valid, or at least important subjects for debate, the ideology of soft anti-Americanism is repeatedly employed as a political tool--a sort of wedge issue that forces voters to choose between their own government and being on the side of Washington, whose policies so many abhor.
In the end, especially since other governments do not pursue policies that are legitimately alternatives to Washington (at least in terms of the moralistic typesets in which these issues are framed), soft anti-Americanism is an ideology like any other: disobedient of its own logic, not always rational, and often arbitrary. Just as Americans espoused anti-communism for reasons not always connected to, for instance, the human rights abuses of the Soviet Union, so does anti-Americans' opposition to Washington not always conform to their own stated principles.
<1> Olick, Jeffrey. “What Does it Mean to Normalize the Past? Official Memory in German Politics Since 1989" in Social Science History, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter 1998), 547-571.
<2> Werz, Michael. “Anti-Americanism and Ambivalence in the New Germany” in US-Europe Analysis Series, Brookings Institution, (January 2005), 3.
<3> Serfaty, Simon. “Anti-Europeanism in America and anti-Americanism in Europe,” in Balis & Serfaty, eds. Visions of America and Europe: September 11, Iraq, and Transatlantic Relations, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004, 11.
<4> From URL: http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/message/index.php?messageDate=2002-05-27
“The day began yesterday with ‘Bowling for Columbine’ winning ‘Best Film’ from a vote of hundreds of French teachers and students from arond the country who each year come to Cannes and award one movie their ‘Cannes Prix Educational National.’ It's the only ‘people's prize’ at Cannes where everyday citizens get to screen the films and vote. It was a wonderful moment and a great honor to receive this award. The Education Ministry in France has made ‘Roger & Me’ part of the French national curriculum and it is shown each year in every school in France. The same will now happen with ‘Bowling for Columbine.’”
<5> The most famous study of “social imperialism” in Germany is Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s German Empire, 1871-1918, Oxford: Berg, 1985, trans. by Kim Traynor. Many level the same criticism at US foreign policy, but given the evidence in the European case, it is possible to say that the phenomenon plays a role everywhere.
posted by Evan Campbell at 4:05 PM
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